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Of enduring interest to me over the years have been questions about moral 
agents responses in the aftermath of wrongdoing. The project of articulating 
the responsibilities of offenders, victims of harm, and witnesses to wrongs 
inevitably involves description of our moral and emotional capacities. When 
it comes to the moral psychology of forgiveness, questions as to what we can 
control and what is out of our control are important. Can we overcome inward 
feelings of anger, resentment, guilt, self-righteousness, indignation, schaden-
freude, and defensiveness? How do moral choices to forgive affect the jumble 
of unexpected feelings after a wrongdoing? Further, the expectations of oth-
ers, for example, the cultural expectation that women may be more forgiving 
than men, present external sources of the uncontrollable, complicating the 
possibilities for ethical recommendations to forgive or not.1
Such preoccupations have informed my scholarship. Yet like many phi-
losophers drawn to the topic of forgiveness, I have routinely encountered the 
following objection to a presentation or paper. Especially at those times when 
Im most gripped by moral issues arising from difficult experiences with 
serious harm or traumatic memories recurring long after a wrong, I net the 
following response from some philosophers: But thats psychology. The 
implication is that where there is psychology, one is not doing philosophy. 
Complications for ethical theory that stem from the limitations of human 
minds and bodies or the multiplicities of human experiences are seen by such 
objectors as, while unfortunate or painful, largely irrelevant to abstract ide-
alizations of morality. At those times when philosophers have suggested that 
philosophical questions should not occur in an admixture with psychology, 
I have found that the interdisciplinary scholarship of forgiveness affirms me 
in my course. As psychologist Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela says in the first 
chapter of this volume, Philosophical questions such as the moral inappro-
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priateness of forgiveness can and should give way and be subsumed to human 
questions, for in the end we are a society of people and not of ideas, a fragile 
web of interdependent human beings, not of stances.2 It is a recommenda-
tion consistent with what some philosophers call naturalistic ethics, the 
commitments of which include the belief that moral philosophy should not 
employ a distinctive a priori method of yielding substantive, self-evident and 
foundational truths from pure conceptual analysis. . . . Indeed, the naturalist is 
committed to there being no sharp distinction between her investigation and 
those of relevant other disciplines.3
I was intrigued, as one such naturalist, when I was informed by series edi-
tor Mark Alfano that he invited proposals for anthologies in moral psychol-
ogy including forgiveness. Given what Susan Dwyer has called the relative 
newnessat least among philosophersof thinking seriously about morality 
as involving a set of capacities that are amenable to empirical investiga-
tion,4 I was drawn to Alfanos description of the possibilities of volumes on 
particular moral emotions; he suggested that a volume could serve not as an 
encyclopedia or a handbook, but rather as a collection of perspectives, build-
ing a mosaic for each emotion and evaluating both its nature and its moral 
properties. The result of contributors efforts before you is not a compendium 
of all possible treatments of moral psychology and forgiveness; instead it is a 
collection of distinctive perspectives on empirically informed understandings 
of forgiveness. Selections appear in order from the more psychological or 
philosophically applied to the more philosophically abstract, but I hope read-
ers will find, as I do, that they ultimately inform and enhance each other. The 
authors assembled here offer views that sometimes harmonize and at other 
times disagree with each other; I solicited their participation partly because I 
believe the juxtaposition of approaches is productive of new and better think-
ing about forgiveness. For the sake of proceeding with a rough understand-
ing of the subject, I offer the following amalgam of authors accounts of the 
meaning of the term: they tend to converge on elements of forgiveness as a 
moral and therefore at least partly voluntary response to a wrongdoer that 
reflects commitment to or expresses a change in feelings about the wrong 
done and that (re)accepts the offender as a member of a moral community.
Granting that the second chapter presents a more scientific study, it is 
largely the case in this volume that, without sacrificing necessary method-
ological descriptions and terminologies, the contributions of psychologists 
and philosophers are written in accessible terms for interdisciplinary audi-
ences and for newcomers to the subject with interest in forgiveness but no 
prior background. Although contributors write invitationally and accessibly, 
it is also the case that they do not start at the beginning of the interdisciplinary 
conversation about forgiveness. Forgiveness is a subject that has enjoyed an 
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intensity of interest in the past thirty years in both psychology and philoso-
phy. Instead of introducing the literature, contributors often raise challenges 
to understandings of forgiveness or to recommending forgiveness in concrete 
contexts.
Given the impressive scope of forgiveness studies today, it is difficult for 
a collection of works on it to comprehensively convey the many approaches 
useful to understanding its meaning, worth, and practice. To contextualize the 
conversations joined by my contributors, I offer a brief survey of thematic 
elements in contemporary literature on forgiveness and then an overview of 
the responses to that literature comprising the contents of this volume. To 
exercise some selectivity, I concentrate on discussing themes in psychol-
ogy and philosophy that come closest to addressing the moral psychology 
of forgiveness, rather than canvassing the rich, but more discipline-specific, 
work in either field. Because I am a philosopher, my interest is chiefly in 
the extent to which work in moral psychology provides a needed corrective 
to some excesses in philosophical aversion to empirically informed theoriz-
ing. Therefore my overview is primarily one of the state of philosophical 
literature, with the eventual aim of complicating what has been referred to at 
times as the standard or classic view, by which philosophers often mean the 
predominant view of forgiveness in the first half of the thirty-year boom in 
contemporary philosophy of forgiveness. I conclude with my own perspec-
tive on forgiveness as a further challenge to consider psychological contexts 
in which forgiveness may be seen primarily as a commitment rather than 
primarily as an emotional state.
First, some overview of the expansion in the literature on moral psychol-
ogy of forgiveness is in order. In the surge of publications on the subject in 
the late 1980s and 1990s, psychologists argued for the potential functions of 
forgiveness in therapeutic counseling. Authors such as Robert D. Enright (a 
contributor to this volume) expressed interest in the well-being of victims 
of wrongdoing who experienced levels of resentment and anger that inter-
fered with living well and emotionally recovering from harm.5 Psychologists 
including Everett Worthington and Michael McCullough attended to the 
desire to repair relationships and to the psychological needs of victims and 
transgressors.6 Forms of anger, grudge-holding, or resentment that clients of 
psychologists reported a desire to diminish received attention from psycholo-
gists as possible barriers to individual well-being and to relationships, and 
forgiveness emerged as a possible response of intense interest.
Later expansion of literature in the social sciences on forgiveness was 
also due in part to the activities of post-conflict social projects such as South 
Africas Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), on which contributor 
Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela served as a member and coordinator of public 
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hearings. Archbishop Desmond Tutu, who first headed the TRC when it 
was established in 1996, has famously argued that without forgiveness, 
there really is no future, and psychologists including Gobodo-Madikizela 
have worked to articulate the different senses in which victims and offend-
ers understand the meanings of forgiveness, the embodied experiences of 
feeling the attendant emotions incurred by the activities of the TRC, and the 
potentials, but also the limits, of forgiveness as a moral and psychological 
response.7 As the literature in psychology expanded, further critical voices 
appeared, including early attention to feminist concerns that positive psy-
chology may disadvantage already oppressed and vulnerable groups. Sharon 
Lamb, for example, became a leading voice in raising concerns both about 
whether different sorts of victims are equally benefited by the results of 
forgiveness in therapy and whether forgiveness in counseling was morally 
and socially problematic to the extent that it may leave social problems unad-
dressed.8 Psychologists attention to gender was just one of many cultural di-
mensions along which forgiveness was studied; a rich example of the results 
is Womens Reflections on the Complexities of Forgiveness, edited by Wanda 
Malcolm, Nancy DeCourville, and Kathryn Belicki. Their analyses regularly 
focus on the effects of forgiveness and the views that clients express toward 
the role of forgiveness in their attitudes toward their own past actions, their 
personal relationships, and their moral lives.
The main interests in forgiveness notably differ in philosophy. Early works 
in the 1980s and 1990s include Joram Habers Forgiveness and, most influen-
tially, Jeffrie Murphy and Jean Hamptons Forgiveness and Mercy. Although 
the latter far outstrips the former in citation rates and influence, they are con-
sistent with each other and notably different from much work in psychology 
at the time. While psychologists advocating forgiveness wrote regarding the 
value of reducing the pain, anger, and suffering of victims and even transgres-
sors, and psychologist-critics attended to differential benefits and effects on 
societies, philosophers expressed much more interest in the moral rights of 
victims and the extent to which forgiveness was (in)compatible with retribu-
tive justice and self-respect. Further, philosophers expressed skepticism of 
the value of anger management or pain reduction as morally relevant in any 
way at all. Joram Haber and Jeffrie Murphy, in particular, argued forcefully 
against accounts of outcomes like the health of oneself or the community as 
instructive of the moral appropriateness of forgiveness. Murphy contended 
that the question as to what forgiveness is cannot after all be sharply distin-
guished from the question How is forgiveness justified?9 In other words, 
forgiveness was represented in its most basic conception in an idealized way 
that answered to nonconsequentialist forms of justification. Representative of 
this view, Haber said the beneficial results to forgivers are largely irrelevant 
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from a moral point of view; rather than argue that positive results do not 
occur (although he suggested that they sometimes dont), Haber objected that 
consequentialist reasons . . . are essentially practical, rather than moral.10
More often than not, philosophers at the time generally argued that forgive-
ness is essentially an internal state, a change of heart rather than a behavior, 
a belief, a commitment, or a speech act, and that it was only genuine forgive-
ness when justified. Most notably, Murphy held that forgiveness is primarily 
a matter of changing how one feels with respect to a person who has done one 
an injury, specifically overcoming resentment in a way that is compatible 
with self-respect; he added [Jean] Hampton sees this as a prelude to forgive-
ness; I see it as the very thing.11 Murphy based his conception of forgive-
ness as the overcoming of resentment on the conceptual analysis of Bishop 
Joseph Butler, whose 1796 sermons argue for the value of sudden resentment 
against injury as a mark of moral concern for oneself and for others and for 
the value of forgiveness as a remedy to settled anger. (Butler maintained that 
we should not indulge in a passion, which, if generally indulged, would 
propagate itself so as almost to lay waste the world.12) Interestingly, Butler 
argued that injuries against either oneself or others are reason for resentment 
and forgiveness; Murphy and Haber maintained that resentment applied only 
to injuries one suffers oneself and not to witnessing the injuries of others. 
Consideration of social contexts were not central to philosophical treatments 
in this period; authors more often articulated conceptual analyses abstracted 
from empirical information, developing distinctions between forgiveness and 
excuse, mercy, pardon, and forgetting.13
The early influence of accounts oriented firmly around the self-respect of 
individual victims and against consequentialism or self-care as morally sa-
lient led to two related tendencies in philosophy in the 2000s and 2010s. First, 
Murphys account, and thereby Butlers, came to be referred to as the classic, 
standard, or paradigm view, which readers will find reflected in contributions 
in this volume (this is why youll see references to Butlerian resentment). At 
the same time, a proliferation of new publications came to challenge that view 
and prioritize different considerations, including those of naturalistic ethics, 
relational ethics, social philosophy, and feminist philosophy. The departures 
from the predominant view have been many and varied. For example, phi-
losopher Glen Pettigrove has prominently argued for seeing forgiveness as a 
speech act that sets moral machinery in motion and affects the psychology of 
wrongdoers in important ways, an insight consistent with the findings of the 
psychologists who contribute the second chapter of this volume. Pettigrove 
suggests that the predominant account of forgiveness as the emotional state 
of a reduction in resentment is just one possible lowest common denomina-
tor view of the nature of forgiveness, and not always the best one if we wish 
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to consider functions of forgiveness in the absence of a requisite emotion.14 
Trudy Govier argues for group forgiveness and third-party forgiveness in 
ways that loosen the sole focus on victims internal senses of self-respect; 
her relational work serves as one of the supports in Alice MacLachlans femi-
nist contribution in the last chapter of this volume.15 Robin Dillon, Charles 
Griswold, and I argue in different ways for self-forgiveness as a form of 
third-party forgiveness, and Griswold and I develop differing conceptions of 
forgiveness as a virtue.16 Philosophers including Dillon, Jeremy Watkins, and 
Margaret Holmgren argue for forward-looking reasons to forgive that do 
not depend on perpetrator acknowledgment for evidence of a victims justi-
fied forgiveness and do not necessarily overcome every trace of negative feel-
ing.17 Increasingly, philosophers base their accounts of the nature of forgive-
ness on the testimony often provided in psychological accounts. MacLachlan 
agrees with Margaret Walker that, given the available empirical information 
regarding the many meanings and practices of forgiveness for different 
peoples, efforts to articulate the perfect paradigm of moral forgiveness [are] 
a doomed enterprise, and rejects a single correct idea of forgiveness, in the 
way that there is a correct theory of the structure of DNA.18
Perhaps we can now, at last, concur that what has been called classic or 
paradigmatic forgiveness is ultimately an idealized picture that rarely actu-
ally obtains. I say this knowing that two of the contributions to this volume 
defend a more traditional, internalist, and emotional account: Forgiveness 
and Reconciliation, by Barrett Emerick, and Once More with Feeling: De-
fending the Goodwill Account of Forgiveness, by David McNaughton and 
Eve Garrard. Yet in the course of defending their unilateral and more internal 
accounts of forgiveness, these contributors also expand the sets of emotions, 
utterances, and actors involved in forgiveness beyond the standard account 
centering resentment.
I have come to think that philosophers can and should attend, better than 
we always have, to the point of appealing to a paradigm at all. As Ive said 
elsewhere, appealing to a paradigm may perform one of three functions. The 
first is the entirely neutral job of identifying a pattern in contemporary theo-
rizing without endorsing it as correct or even as very widely shared; rather, a 
paradigm view is a dominant, organizing account that tends to affect the way 
discourse proceeds. In that sense, Murphys conception of forgiveness is cer-
tainly paradigmatic. We also often appeal to a paradigm to indicate an area of 
general agreement among theorists, a point of convergence, as when we say 
that paradigm forgiveness does not condone or excuse the wrong, a common 
feature among otherwise disparate accounts of forgiveness. This second sense 
of paradigm is often used to connote an ideal and is not merely a neutral 
report of a pattern. It identifies desirable definitional elements. Clear cases 
17_063_Norlock.indb   12 2/15/17   10:26 AM
 The Challenges of Forgiveness in Context xiii
and central features are appealing, allowing us to feel we have arrived at some 
consensus about the nature of forgiveness. Yet Robin May Schotts criticism 
of this approach correlates with my arguments: The risk of this strategy . . . 
is that the conceptual analysis of forgiveness becomes a lens that directs the 
lines of inquiry, instead of creating an opening for other moral lenses.19 This 
should give anyone in pursuit of a paradigm pause.
Third, we occasionally argue for new paradigms, by which we mean mod-
els that many may not share, but that serve as more accurate and reflective 
examples of occasions for moral behavior and promote certain priorities. It is 
my hope that as attention to forgiveness enters its maturity, new paradigms 
of forgiveness will better reflect the sentiment MacLachlan expresses in her 
contribution in this volume: A philosophical account should distill those fea-
tures and functions that are central to the concept as it emerges from everyday 
practices and develop a rational or regulative ideal that best reflects them. If 
these cannot be unified into a single, universal paradigm, it is better to sit with 
complexity than to deny the phenomenology of moral experience.
The first contribution is a model of sitting with complexity. Psycholo-
gist Pumla Gobodo-Madikizelas piece, Intersubjectivity and Embodi-
ment: Exploring the Role of the Maternal in the Language of Forgiveness 
and Reconciliation, is essential reading for anyone seeking to understand 
why it is important to naturalize ethics and sets the tone for the volume. In 
it she discusses her experiences with South Africas Truth and Reconcilia-
tion Commission in order to advance appreciation for dialogical contexts in 
which dealing with the past permits discovering and nurturing the conditions 
that make forgiveness first conceivable, then ultimately possible. Gobodo-
Madikizela provides readers with reason to hold that the moral powers of 
individuals and groups to assert the meaningfulness of forgiving or refusing 
forgiveness should be the starting point for any theorizing about forgiveness. 
As she argues regarding her work in South African communities, to say that 
even horrific deeds are simply unforgivable does not capture the complexity 
and richness of all the social contexts within which gross human rights abuses 
are committed. In the social contexts she considers in the selection in this 
volume, Gobodo-Madikizela explicitly sets aside her previous explorations 
of the meaning of the term forgiveness in order to attend to the felt and 
embodied experiences of black South African women. Her focus includes 
women who express motivations for forgiving, including senses of responsi-
bility to the community as well as empathy, expressed with the Xhosa word 
inimba, which refers to the umbilical cord and can be interpreted to mean 
the feeling of motherhood. The complexities of the embodied, culturally 
located, and emotional motivations of these women suggest that no single 
account of forgiveness captures the reasons for different victims to forgive.
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As many readers know, a contentious aspect of forgiveness, especially in 
such contexts as truth and reconciliation commissions, is the danger of an 
expectation that wrongdoers will be provided with reconciliation and forgive-
ness that they do not deserve, without ever expressing remorse or apology. 
Therefore the next chapter will be of interest to those who wonder what the 
effects of forgiveness are upon wrongdoers. In What Victims Say and How 
They Say It Matters: Effects of Victims Post-Transgression Responses and 
Form of Communication on Transgressors Apologies, psychologist Ward 
Struthers and colleagues explore victims post-transgression responses in 
some detail, with an eye to discerning whether forgiveness or its refusal mo-
tivated apologies on the part of offenders. They find that forgiving responses 
generated greater motivation for wrongdoers to apologize when they were 
communicated using an indirect form rather than the more direct statement 
I forgive you. Intriguingly, they also find that unforgiving responses gener-
ated greater motivation to apologize when they were communicated using 
a more direct form. In other words, their results further disrupt simplistic 
understandings of forgiveness as necessarily functional or unforgivingness as 
necessarily dysfunctional in promoting the repair of relationships. Moreover, 
like Gobodo-Madikizela, Struthers et al. suggest that victims consideration 
of forgiveness is a part of the circumstances making some reconciliation 
possible: Victims can play an active role in the reconciliation process by 
facilitating apologies in transgressors and making them feel accepted back 
into the moral community. This original contribution is distinctive in offer-
ing evidence that direct expressions of unforgiving can serve that accepting 
function in addition to indirect expressions of forgiving.
Whether victims can develop the capacities to forgive even in childhood 
is the focus of psychologists Robert D. Enright and Mary Jacqueline Song in 
the next chapter, An Aristotelian Perspective on Forgiveness Education in 
Contentious World Regions. Enright and Song argue for a conception of a 
virtue of forgiveness based in part on their experiences with developing for-
giveness education in elementary school settings in Belfast and Milwaukee. 
In building their case for a virtue of forgiveness, they pause to parse distinc-
tions between the uses of the term resentment in psychology and in phi-
losophy. They suggest that psychologists tend to describe resentment in terms 
of longstanding and excessive anger and that philosophers tend to describe 
resentment in terms of immediate moral responses to injury; the former, they 
argue, is to be overcome and not fostered. Their contribution reduces the 
sense one can take from some forgiveness literature that psychologists and 
philosophers disagree as sharply as we sometimes seem to do, and instead 
Enright and Song direct attention to achieving manageable, nonclinical levels 
of anger. It is a further disruption of accounts of forgiveness as the eradication 
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of negative feelings about a wrongdoer or harm, promoting instead a view of 
forgiveness compatible with living well with appropriate or reduced but still 
present negative feelings. Enright and Song further distinguish between the 
propositional thoughts accompanying resentment and the emotions accompa-
nying the thoughts, encouraging efforts at modeling different thoughts rather 
than recommending different feelings. Their results indicate that children in 
first-, third-, fourth-, and fifth-grade classes decreased statistically signifi-
cantly in anger compared to control groups and did so in part with practice 
in inherent worth thinking as informed by stories and pictures, appeals to 
concrete examples and exemplars.
Of course, adults are also regularly presented with exemplars of forgive-
ness, as philosopher Myisha Cherry discusses in the subsequent chapter. In 
Forgiveness, Exemplars, and the Oppressed, Cherrys concern is focused 
on those occasions when oppressed people are presented with exemplars, and 
she argues that, when used as instructions rather than as illustrative examples 
of larger principles, exemplars are a form of fallacious appeal that undermine 
the autonomy of victims, encouraging imitation rather than reflection. Cherry 
considers the Kantian perspective that moral exemplars are useful for moral 
education. She clarifies the distinction between imitation and emulation as 
a difference in unthinking versus reflective action. While contributions like 
Strutherss explore victims post-transgression reactions, including expres-
sions that are forgiving, Cherry explores the expressions of others to victims 
that they ought to forgive as exemplars have forgiven. What effects do the en-
dorsements of exemplars have on victims of serious harm? In a literal sense, 
how are victims to think? Cherry notes that the forgiveness exemplar is held 
up to persuade the victim motivationally, not just to illustrate a principle. As 
she says, in some cases the exemplars themselves become the reason to for-
give. She concludes, with Kant, that reason and emotion have or should have 
a relationship in morality and that attempts to appeal to exemplars may com-
mit fallacies of reasoning. She appreciates the value of forgiveness exemplars 
that can represent morality, inspire and give hope to others, be something to 
emulate, and aid in moral education. However, she cautions against public 
appeals by powerful individuals to forgiveness exemplars: When those in 
positions of power attempt to persuade the powerless to forgive by using 
exemplars, we have reasons to view their arguments as extremely dubious.
Like Cherry, philosopher Jonathan Jacobs is similarly concerned with at-
titudes and sentiments in the public sphere, especially in the criminal justice 
context with which he is centrally concerned. In Resentment, Punitiveness, 
and Forgiveness: Criminal Sanction and Civil Society, Jacobs argues that it 
is public attitudes and perspectives that shape the civic culture. Like Enright 
and Song, he also addresses moral education, as he notes that for Adam Smith, 
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actually having apt and fit sentiments is not automatic. One learns to have 
them, and such learning is a crucial element of moral education. Jacobs 
explores Adam Smiths conception of resentment in some detail, especially 
to the extent that resentment can erode relations and undermine the values 
crucial to maintaining the civility of society. Yet he is in strong sympathy 
with Smiths view that resentment has its purposes as a crucial moral senti-
ment. Jacobs attends to the multifold dimensions on which criminal justice in 
America in particular is ultimately shaped for the worse by public resentments, 
hostilities, and indifference, but he concludes that forgiveness is not usually 
apt as a response in this constrained context. As he says, there are considerable 
difficulties concerning the right spirit in which we are to forgive, and the right 
conditions, and the difficulties are multiplied in the context of criminal justice.
Contributors David McNaughton and Eve Garrard resolve the conflict 
between negative attitudes and the right spirit of forgiveness with arguments 
that forgiveness of even unrepentant offenders can be morally admirable, but 
forgiveness is compatible with indignation, outrage, and denunciation of an 
offense. In Once More with Feeling: Defending the Goodwill Account of 
Forgiveness, they argue that not all negative attitudes are hostile attitudes; 
how moral emotions feel may be quite similarly negative, but some have 
judgments and objects compatible with forgiving while others do not. They 
further distinguish between feeling ill-willed and bearing ill will toward 
another, suggesting the first is psychologically involuntary while the second 
is at least partially voluntary, a cultivated disposition that includes some de-
cisional component to carry forward. In a move related to the arguments of 
Struthers et al., McNaughton and Garrard argue that there are moral reasons 
to apologize after being forgiven. Although they argue, against predominant 
conceptions, that there is more to forgiving than merely overcoming resent-
ment, they also build a case for holding a more traditional conception of 
forgiveness, that forgiving is something you do in your heart, rather than an 
explicit performative utterance that can be taken at face value by a listener. 
They consider in some detail arguments to the contrary, but they conclude 
that forgiveness consists in holding a certain belief and not in expressing that 
belief to another.
They have good company with philosopher Barrett Emerick, whose 
contribution follows. In Forgiveness and Reconciliation, Emerick argues 
for an expansion of the traditional view that forgiveness is concerned with 
resentment, and like McNaughton and Garrard, Emerick further argues for 
a unilateral and thoroughly internal account of forgiveness rather than, for 
example, a speech act. In disagreement with McNaughton and Garrard, how-
ever, Emerick holds that ones own welfare as a victim is a moral reason to 
forgive (dismissed by McNaughton and Garrard as merely therapeutic). He 
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is also the only contributor to explicitly advance the view that forgiveness 
comes in degrees; addressing the psychological obstacle that complete or 
perfect forgiveness is often impossible, Emerick sensibly advocates for the 
worth of partial forgiveness. On his view, forgiveness is a term that refers to 
both a practice and sometimes an achievement. He explains why reconcilia-
tion requires forgiveness and argues for epistemic requirements to be met on 
the part of both victims and wrongdoers in reconciliation processes, saying 
they need to know, at least to some extent, how the other feels, understanding 
enough about the inner lives of others for reconciliation to be genuine.
That understanding is not limited to victims and wrongdoers, according 
to our final contribution, In Defense of Third-Party Forgiveness. Philoso-
pher Alice MacLachlan explores the capacity to forgive a wrong and its 
grounds beyond that of victimization. A personal connection to a wrong-
doer or victim can be indirect, she notes, and the personal quality of some 
connections possesses a kind of limited transitivity. Forgiveness on the 
part of someone other than the victim, or third-party forgiveness, relies on 
personal but indirect relationships to wrongdoers and victims. She further 
discusses when we can trust in the appearance of that transitivity, that is, 
when third parties are well-placed to sensitively and sincerely give or refuse 
forgiveness to wrongdoers. She concludes that third-party forgiveness has 
a double grounding in imaginative sympathy and transitive personal rela-
tions of identification and care. She argues for conceptual clarity in our 
moral psychology in order to make better recommendations in our ethical 
prescriptions, a fitting end to a volume collecting the perspectives of psy-
chologists and philosophers.
I find MacLachlans views most akin to my own. Elsewhere I argue that the 
fragmented nature of the self, especially the traumatized self, is one that sup-
ports and enables the possibilities of self-inflicted evil and self-forgiveness, 
and it is difficult to account for self-forgiveness either for harms to oneself or 
harms to others unless we can sensibly say that third-party forgiveness is pos-
sible; that is, in self-forgiving, we forgive the wrongdoer although someone 
else (a past self, another person) is the victim.20 Perhaps not surprisingly, the 
fragmented self is also the source of obstacles to self-forgiveness, as is the 
unpredictability of memory. Although I came to a view of forgiveness as a 
commitment through writing about self-forgiveness, I conclude that forgive-
ness of others may also be sensibly referred to as primarily a commitment, a 
promise to oneself that one may need to repeatedly renew with the passage 
of time. I rest my reasons for holding its commitment-like nature on the view 
that we can have relationships with our past, present, and future selves, and 
on views of beliefs as, rather than true or false propositions, more like modes 
of conduct, enacting attitudes in the way that we choose to live.
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So I conclude this introduction with my own challenge to my contributors. 
I outline the account of belief upon which I rely and argue for forgiveness 
as a commitment in light of the practices that believing and holding attitudes 
based on those beliefs may require. I then proceed to my account of self-
forgiveness as one form of such a commitment, which one has to ones cur-
rent and future selves.
In saying that forgiveness is a commitment, I do not mean to imply that 
we cannot overcome certain feelings or maintain substantial changes in our 
attitudes. I agree with Trudy Goviers account of personhood as entailing 
some capability for moral transformation.21 Because persons are so capable, 
Govier further argues that victims should never give up on another human 
being, never commit to being unforgiving, because wrongdoers with person-
hood are capable of moral transformation.22 She indicates that if victims know 
that wrongdoers are persons, then it is a failure of the moral respect due all 
persons to disbelieve that a wrongdoer can change and become worthy of 
forgiveness. I agree that victims can know that a person is capable of future 
moral transformation, but I disagree with Goviers statement in the same 
work that victims should never give up on another human being; I would 
not go so far as to say that victims fail morally when they adopt pessimistic 
or hopeless attitudes about the prospects of their wrongdoers moral change. 
One may have knowledge without belief, one may have correct and true be-
liefs that are not the basis of a particular attitude, and one may have attitudes 
that are predicated on attitudinal content in conflict with those true beliefs. 
To defend the distinction between a victims knowledge of a proposition, a 
victims belief in a proposition, and a victims attitude toward a person, I rely 
on Blake Myers-Schultzs and Eric Schwitzgebels co-authored account of 
knowledge without belief.23 I then turn to Schwitzgebels account of disposi-
tional attitudes outside the belief box.24
Myers-Schultz and Schwitzgebel cite Gilbert Ryles account of know and 
believe as dispositional verbs of quite disparate types. Know is a capacity 
verb, and a capacity verb of that special sort that is used for signifying that 
the person described can bring things off, or get things right. Believe, on the 
other hand, is a tendency verb and one which does not connote that anything 
is brought off or got right.25 Myers-Schultz and Schwitzgebel provide em-
pirical evidence that respondents to thought experiments consistently distin-
guish between the same agent knowing P and yet not believing P. They con-
clude, It is not prima facie obvious that all instances of knowledge are also 
instances of belief; instead it is as though knowledge requires only having 
the information stored somewhere and available to be deployed to guide ac-
tion, while belief requires some consistency in deploying the information (at 
least dispositionally or counterfactually).26 Knowledge of a true proposition 
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can be on or off. The proposition is true or it is false. It does not appear that 
belief follows propositional knowledge so inevitably that one can be held 
responsible for failing at belief, however. If knowledge does not entail belief, 
then at times the knowledge-switch will be set to on while the belief falters.
Belief in the moral transformative powers of wrongdoers starts to sound 
more like a virtue or an imperfect duty. As I said, I agree with Goviers view 
of personhood, the proposition that moral transformation is possible for indi-
vidual human beings with moral agency; moral agents are capable of at least 
some moral transformation. Yet even as I know that, I am inclined to agree with 
Myers-Schultz and Schwitzgebel that knowledge does not entail belief, that the 
former may be a propositional bit of information while the latter reflects a 
tendency to succeed.27 To believe is to carry ones knowledge forward into 
situations; it is to bring it off, to get its application right in the presence of com-
peting information. If so, then a failure to believe what I know is not necessar-
ily a moral failure (although it can be). A prescription regarding what victims 
ought to believe amounts to a recommendation to carry forward a practice, the 
success conditions of which are not entirely up to victims; more importantly, it 
is not a moral failure in ones respect for personhood, which one can know that 
one ought to bear, regardless of what one believes over time.
For related reasons, attitudes that rely on our beliefs are difficult to contain 
in inner landscapes; as Schwitzgebel says, To have an attitude is, at root, 
to live a certain way. . . . It is to have, in general though probably only im-
perfectly, a certain profile of outward behavior and inner experience, . . . to 
embody a certain broad-ranging actual and counterfactual pattern of activity 
and reactivity.28 Attitudes are not internal representations written in a Belief 
Box, Schwitzgebel says, but come with postures and patterns of behavior in 
the world, and he argues this account for both propositional attitudes (in the 
set of which he includes believing and hoping) and reactive attitudes (in the 
set of which he includes resenting, forgiving, and being angry).29 If knowl-
edge does not entail belief, then belief does not entail appropriate attitudes, 
and Schwitzgebel rejects as misleading the view that an attitude is a mat-
ter of possessing some particular internally stored representational content, a 
content perhaps poised to play some specific set of cognitive roles depending 
on the attitude type.30 Instead of holding that to have an attitude is to have 
a relationship to a belief, Schwitzgebel argues that to have an attitude is to 
have, though probably only imperfectly, a certain profile of outward behav-
ior and inner experience . . . to embody a certain broad-ranging actual and 
counterfactual pattern of activity and reactivity.31
I suggest that forgiveness can be just such an attitude, a pattern of activity 
and reactivity, neither essentially an inward feeling nor essentially an utter-
ance or behavior. Because it is not entirely up to us when and how well we 
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are embodying the attitude, the moral and motivated, decisional component 
of such an attitude is best accounted for as a commitment to enact the atti-
tude in the world. To borrow Schwitzgebels language, I see a commitment 
to forgiveness as one aspiring to the practice, over time, of embodying that 
broad-ranging pattern he describes, and therefore forgiveness can be a speech 
act prior to having all of the expected, attendant emotions one might describe 
as forgiving. A view of forgiveness as a belief requiring continual recommit-
ment is compatible with forgiveness sometimes consisting in a speech act, 
because as Cheshire Calhoun says, Reflection on the content of the social 
practice of morality is what normative moral theorizing should be about. The 
theorist is not to begin by ignoring actual social practices of morality, includ-
ing those that shape the theorists own thought, in order to construct an ideal 
normative standard to then be applied in evaluating actual practices.32 Mo-
rality refers to how we engage others as much as it refers to how we develop 
and shape principles and theories, and moral social practices are not anterior 
applications of theories; the social practice of morality really is morality.33 
I agree with Calhoun that these two conceptions of morality, the theoretical 
one aiming to get it right and the social one aiming to live with others, work 
together and sometimes in tension due to the plurality of our moral aims.
For these reasons, I tend to oppose arguments, like those by Emerick 
and by McNaughton and Garrard in this volume, that later wishing to tell 
someone I didnt really forgive you when I said I did somehow reveals 
that forgiveness is essentially internal. Instead it seems to me that moral 
agents have a plurality of moral aims, including the aim of forgiveness as an 
expression of acceptance of a wrongdoer and the aim of overcoming ones 
own hostile feelings regarding a wrong. Theyre both forgiveness in differ-
ent functioning forms, accomplishing different moral aims, referred to by 
the same word. Words admit ambiguity, and that is why it is coherent for a 
wrongdoer to take someone who communicated forgiveness before feeling it 
to have actually forgiven the wrongdoer. One moral aim was accomplished, 
while another with the same referent was not. Our plural moral aims reveal 
precisely why moral life is so difficult and moral psychology so important 
to articulate.
I have argued elsewhere that forgiveness is centrally relational, and the na-
ture of the relationship, especially the power relationship, that it is employed 
to repair provides important information as to the content of the normative 
role of forgiveness. Some relationships, especially between caregivers and 
those cared for, are (among other things) fiduciary relationships, marked 
by the expectation that one party will use his or her judgment to act in the 
best interests of the other,34 and other relationships between more equal 
parties (for example, married adults) are structured in part by their explicit, 
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expressed commitments. In short, not all relationships are entirely chosen and 
not all relationships leave trust-building and wellness-maintaining activities 
to chance. Therefore, again unlike some of my contributors to this volume, I 
take it to be erroneous to hold that forgiveness is always necessarily elective 
because it is insufficiently responsive to the contexts that endow commitment 
to forgiveness with its appropriate moral import.
I realize that some philosophers may hold that one cannot be required to 
make a promise or a commitment. But the position that commitments can-
not be required seems, like necessarily elective forgiveness, an acontextual 
and nonrelational treatment of the nature of forgiveness. Surely, in certain 
relationships, one can absolutely be confronted with normative expectations 
to make commitments and promises. For example, when one takes on the re-
sponsibilities involved in caring for children or vulnerable adults, it is easy to 
imagine moral demands or requirements to make promises. Im under some 
pressure to design a syllabus because even my adult and elective university 
students expect me to make commitments and promises that, given my ob-
ligations as structural of the relationship, are required of me, reasonable to 
demand. Wedding vows are regularly arranged between couples with respect 
to what promises are expected, not just for the sake of the ceremony itself 
but as a reflection of particular values that couple believes structural to the 
marital relationship. And my upcoming citizenship application to Canada in-
cludes the requirement that I make certain promises (in the form of an oath), 
an expectation with which I am keen to comply. Forgiveness can function 
similarly, as Linda Ross Meyer suggests with her example of saying to her 
child I am still angry, but I forgive you anyway.35 As children, we need to 
believe our parents wont eternally resent us for our minor offenses and even 
for culpably wronging them in order to develop basic senses of trust; espe-
cially in response to the more trivial harms, then, parents may bear special 
obligations to their children to express forgiveness.
I hope it is clear why I do not hold that the expression of a commitment 
to forgive is something less than actually forgiving while the overcoming of 
emotional states is actual; I understand that philosophical views that diverge 
with mine are predicated on a shared view that forgiveness must be a term 
referring to the emotional changes involved in overcoming resentment. Mine 
is a more multidimensional view. Forgiveness is ambiguous and multiply 
realizable in the same way that betting is multiply realizable, sometimes in 
the class of performative illocutions and sometimes not. In other words, it is 
my conviction that when we discuss forgiveness, we may be discussing many 
instantiations of it, including and not limited to the emotional transformation 
that is interior to the forgiving agent. I am advocating a more relational and 
externalist account than do all of my contributors equally.
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I am happy to offer this collection of interdisciplinary thinkers who oc-
casionally disagree with each other and with me. I encourage readers to take 
the differing insights in these contributions as helpful in understanding the 
nature and worth of forgiveness. It is a pleasure to be a part of a multivolume 
series contributing to advancing a multiplicity of perspectives in morality and 
moral psychology.
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